CAMEROON JOINT MONITORING REPORT

Quaterly update on food and nutrition security crisis risks

(April 2026 – REPORT No. 1)

KEY MESSAGES

- The JMR modelling estimates that in March 2026, approximately 4.5 million people out of a total of 30.2 million (15% of the population) were living in areas at risk of experiencing acute food insecurity at IPC/CH level 3 or above. Of these, 1.8 million were in conflict zones (the Far North, North-West and South-West regions), while 2.6 million were in non conflict zones, representing 17% and 13% of their respective populations. The share of the population at risk fell from 22% in January to 16% in February, but averaged 18% (5.4 million people) in Q1 2026, highlighting structural vulnerability.

- Alerts decreased during the first quarter of 2026: 58 in January, 27 in February, and 26 in March, totalling 39 critical risk alerts and 72 heightened risk alerts. The food price volatility indicator recorded the highest number, with 7 critical risk alerts and 57 heightened risk alerts, followed by the drought-rainfall indicator with 31 critical risk alerts and 4 heightened risk alerts, mainly in January. Food prices registered 10 heightened risk alerts overall. The drought-NDVI indicator recorded 1 critical and 1 heightened risk alert in March. No alerts were recorded for the exchange rate or its volatility, reflecting relative stability of the CFA franc against the US dollar.

- Food imports fell from 65 billion CFA francs (Jan 2025) to 54 billion (Mar 2026), mainly due to reduced rice imports following expanded cultivation areas since 2024 and an increase in custom duties. Two major conflicts continue to affect Cameroon: the separatist crisis in the North-West and South-West, and the non-state armed groups insurgency in the Far North. Between January and March 2026, the North-West and South-West recorded 676 incidents and 278 deaths with a strong concentration in Mezam Division, while the Far North saw 163 attacks and 122 deaths, the highest level since 2022. Displacement figures as of 31 March 2026 included 493,402 IDPs (North-West/South-West), 510,855 (Lake Chad Basin), 409,379 refugees, and 790,842 returnees. New displacements between January and March totalled 7,234 in the North-West/South-West and 11,837 in the Far North. Animal health was marked by multi-regional spread of peste des petits ruminants (PPR), under the status “stable and resolved” following the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) standards. Fuel prices have remained stable following a 15% in February 2024, which directly drove up transport costs and food prices. The informal “zoua-zoua” fuel market expanded in border areas near Nigeria, with prices rising by 20–33% following Nigeria’s subsidy removal. Fuel imports surged over the 2026 first quarter, deepening external dependence.

- In conflict zones**,** over one-third of households had inadequate food consumption, compared to one-quarter for the rest of the country. IDPs were the most affected. More than half of households in crisis zones adopted stress strategies (reduced portions, fewer meals), versus one-third in conflict-free zones. Households in conflict zones reduced essential spending and sold productive assets, reflecting weakened livelihoods. The region of the Far North recorded the highest admissions for severe acute malnutrition (SAM), with districts in critical condition, driven by epidemics such as measles.

- In terms of Cameroon’s outlook, several areas of the Far-North (Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Danay), North-West and South-West are expected to remain in Crisis, with risk of pockets escalating to Emergency. The rainy season increases flood risks in the Far North, damaging crops, infrastructure, and causing new displacements. Declining household food stocks heighten market dependence amid persistently high prices. National fuel stocks are low: 38 days for petrol and 12 days for diesel. Exclusive reliance on imports undermines energy security, with geopolitical crises raising persistent challenges in food access and availability which could undermine household food security through higher fuel and fertiliser prices.

Pre-assessment of the Cameroon Food Security Preparedness Plan

In March 2026, estimates based on the Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) model indicate that 4.5 million people (15% of the population) were living in areas at risk of experiencing a crisis situation (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), including 1.8 million in conflict zones and 2.6 million in non-conflict zones. This total is lower than in the two preceding months (January and February) and below the average for the first quarter of 2026. On the basis of current data, activation of the preparedness plan is not recommended at this stage. However, consideration of climate-related risk alert levels and food price dynamics requires heightened vigilance in departments such as Mayo-Rey (North region), Menchum, Mezam and Ngo-Ketunjia (North-West region), and Nkam (Littoral region). Overall, conflict-affected areas continue to display low levels of food consumption associated with a surge in admissions for severe acute malnutrition, particularly in the Far North region. This contrasts with the existence of idle domestic food availability, nevertheless confronted by the weak purchasing power of vulnerable households despite low prices, post-electoral disruptions in distribution channels, and the freezing or sharp reduction of cross-border exports. The conflict in the Middle East raises concerns about potential repercussions on the future dynamics of prices and the costs of fuel and fertiliser supplies.

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.[1] For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

Between January and March 2026, the JMR recorded 39 critical alerts and 72 heightened risk alerts. The food price volatility indicator registered the highest number of alerts, with 7 critical alerts and 57 heightened risk alerts, followed by the drought–precipitation indicator, which recorded 31 critical alerts and 4 heightened risk alerts, mainly in January 2026, a period usually associated with the major dry season (in general, from December to February in the equatorial zone of south Cameroon, and from October to April in the tropical zone of the country's north). Food prices registered a total of 10 heightened risk alerts. The drought–NDVI indicator recorded 1 critical alert and 1 heightened risk alert, both in March 2026. The exchange rate indicator, as well as the exchange rate volatility indicator, did not record any alerts throughout the quarter, reflecting a relative stabilisation of the CFA franc against the US dollar. Please refer to Table 1 for an overview of the high-risk and critical alerts relating to national food security and nutrition, by indicator.

Table 1. Critical and heightened food security risk alerts countrywide by between January and March 2026

INDICATOR	JANUARY 2026		FEBRUARY 2026		MARCH 2026		REGION
	CRA	HRA	CRA	HRA	CRA	HRA	
Drought-NDVI					1	1	West, Southwest
Drought-Rainfall	31	3		1			All regions
Exchange rate							
Food prices		3		5		2	Northwest
Volatility-Exchange rate							
Volatility-Food price	1	20	3	18	3	19	All regions except the West
Total	**32**	**26**	**3**	**24**	**4**	**22**	

Notes: CRA: Critical Risk Alert, HRA: Heightened Risk Alert, NDVI: Normalized Difference Vegetation Index

The JMR modelling shows that in March 2026, approximately 4.5 million people out of a total of 30.2 million (15% of the population) were living in areas at risk of experiencing food insecurity at IPC/CH level 3 or above. Among these

[1] Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers with a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

people, 1.8 million were living in conflict zones (the Far North, North-West and South-West regions), while 2.6 million were in non-conflict zones, representing 17% and 13% of their respective populations. Furthermore, the JMR model indicates a gradual decline in the share of the population at risk, from 22% in January to 16% in February, averaging 18% (around 5.4 million people) over the first quarter of 2026. For a complete historical overview of the population exposed to the risk of deterioration in food and nutrition security (for example, a shift to IPC/CH level 3 or above) from January 2015 to March 2026, please refer to Annex IV, figure 9.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS

This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Drought–NDVI

During the first quarter of 2026, the JMR model recorded one critical risk alert for the drought indicator based on NDVI (vegetation cover and vigour) in Kupe Manengumba Division (South-West). Similarly, one heightened risk alert for this indicator was also recorded in Bamboutos Division (West region). All of these alerts were registered exclusively in March 2026.

The January–February–March 2026 period was characterised agriculturally by the harvesting of off-season crops between January and February in the North and Far North regions. In other regions, February and March 2026 were marked by field preparation activities (clearing, burning and ploughing) and sowing for the first agricultural season of 2026–2027. Although the period from January to March corresponds to the dry season in Cameroon, sporadic and relatively abundant rainfall was recorded between the last ten days of January 2026 and the first ten days of February 2026 in the southern part of the country. For January and February 2026, no risk alerts were recorded by the JMR model for this indicator across all 58 divisions of Cameroon. This indicates that the prevailing climatic conditions (temperature and rainfall) during these months were favourable for vegetation growth, particularly forage, which may have proved beneficial for livestock feeding, especially in the Adamawa, North and Far North regions.

The two risk alerts—1 critical and 1 heightened—recorded by the JMR model in March 2026 in Kupe Manengumba and Bamboutos Divisions concerning vegetation occurred at the time of ploughing and sowing for the first agricultural season of 2026–2027. The abnormally low NDVI values recorded in the said divisions during that month can be explained by post-plowing sowings started during the second ten-day period of March 2026. Overall, the effective onset of the rainy season in March 2026 in the southern regions, combined with slightly above-normal temperatures, appears to have favoured the effective start of sowing for the first agricultural season of the year in these regions.

Drought–Rainfall

Over the period from January to March 2026, the Standardised Precipitation Index (SPI) or the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) indicates that four divisions (Mbam-et-Inoubou, Nyong-et-So'o in the Centre region as well as Moungo in the Littoral region in January; Mayo-Banyo in the Adamaoua region in February) recorded heightened alerts due to widespread drought (negative SPI), combined with the predominance of the harmattan and the southern positioning of the Intertropical Convergence Zone in January.

In addition, 31 divisions (see Annex I, table 2) in the Adamaoua, Centre, East, North, North-West and West regions recorded critical alerts in January, due to the strong persistence of the dry season, resulting in significant degradation of vegetation, evapotranspiration, and a reduction in soil moisture available for plant growth.

Overall, the seasonal bulletins of the National Observatory on Climate Change (ONACC) during the first quarter of 2026 reveal a combination of widespread temperature increases with irregular and spatially contrasting rainfall, as well as signs of water stress in several agroecological zones, marking a worsening of vulnerability. This situation has disrupted the agricultural season, characterized by the degradation of pastures for livestock systems and hindering field preparation activities, thereby undermining future food availability, particularly for rural households dependent on rain-fed agriculture.

However, it should be noted that the January–February–March (JFM) period in Cameroon climatologically corresponds to the major dry season, characterised by an almost complete absence of flood risk. Conversely, as a result of climate change, there has been a strong negative occurrence of standardised precipitation indices during this period, as well as significant deterioration in the vegetation health index, reflected in relatively low NDVI values.

However, since the January–February–March period corresponds to the dry season, there is virtually no flood risk. Nevertheless, due to climate change, this period is marked by a strong negative occurrence of standardised precipitation indices, as well as a sharp decline in vegetation health, reflected in relatively low NDVI values.

Figure 1. Dynamics of Rainfall and Average Temperatures from January to March 2026 in Cameroon



Exchange Rate and Exchange Rate Volatility

During the first quarter of 2026, no alerts were recorded either for the exchange rate or for the volatility of the exchange rate of the US dollar against the CFA franc. This relative stability is indirectly linked to the stabilisation of the US dollar against the euro, which has a fixed parity with the CFA franc (1 € = 655.957 CFA francs). It should be noted, however, that the situation remains fragile in a context of declining foreign exchange reserves, which fell by 2.6% at the end of 2025 to 6,377.3 billion CFA francs (equivalent to 4.2 months of import cover, compared with 4.9 months a year earlier). This has fuelled rumours of a CFA franc devaluation, denied in January 2026 by the monetary authority (https://www.investiraucameroun.com/finance/2001-22986-monnaie-la-beac-ecarte-tout-scenario-de-devaluation-du-fcfa-en-zone-cemac-malgre-la-baisse-des-reserves).

However, analysis of the evolution of the CFA franc exchange rate against the US dollar highlights a year-on-year decline from January 2025 to March 2026, while exchange rate volatility eased from August 2025.

Figure 2. Evolution of the FCFA/US Dollar exchange rate from January 2025 to March 2026



Source: Data from Directorate General of Customs.

On another front, the Nigerian currency, the Naira, experienced a historic decline against the CFA franc. During the first quarter, the volatile evolution of the exchange rate was 1,000 Naira to 383 CFA francs on 31 January, 408 CFA francs on 28 February, and 410 CFA francs on 31 March 2026 (https://wise.com/us/currency-converter/ngn-to-xaf-rate/history). This volatility of the Naira exchange rate against the CFA franc has, all things being equal, restricted Cameroon's cross-border food exports to Nigeria. The overall effect in Cameroon is mixed: the resulting increase in local food availability leads to lower prices and a decline in the incomes and purchasing power of agricultural households that are net exporters and sellers of food products.

Food Prices and Food Price Volatility

The JMR model recorded 10 heightened risk alerts in the North-West during the first quarter of 2026, including 3 in January, 5 in February, and 2 in March. In parallel, 64 alerts were recorded on food price volatility, comprising 7 critical alerts (1 in January, 3 in February, and 3 in March) and 57 heightened risk alerts (20 in January, 18 in February, and 19 in March).

The North-West region is experiencing severe price instability caused by geographical isolation and a security crisis that seriously disrupts food supplies. In the divisions of Boyo, Bui, Donga-Mantung, Menchum and Mezam, deteriorating road infrastructure and dependence on other domestic markets generate recurrent imbalances between supply and demand. Meanwhile, localities such as Diamaré and Faro face marked volatility linked to cross-border trade flows and uncertainties in the agricultural calendar. By contrast, divisions such as Menoua and Noun only experienced a brief seasonal adjustment in January 2026, without major structural risk.

At the national level, since 2025 food prices have shown an almost continuous increase over eleven months, amplified by repeated volatility peaks (+1.3 points in March–April, then +1.1 points in August–September and October–November). The sharp decline in December (–1.1 points), although temporary, does not offset the structural upward trend that resumed during the first quarter of 2026.

The observed food inflation stems from real imbalances between supply and demand. Despite a temporary decline in December, the structural rise and volatility of food prices throughout 2025 weakened purchasing power and heightened the risk of food insecurity for vulnerable households.

FEWS NET and WFP confirm that, although certain cereal prices (maize, sorghum) temporarily fell following limited local harvests and the export ban, the prices of essential products—particularly vegetable oil, imported rice, meat and fish—remain high and well above the five-year average. This is driven by the combined effects of transport costs, dependence on imports, and localised speculative behaviour.

Figure 3. Evolution of food price index (base 100 = January 2022) and food price volatility



Source: Data from National Institute of Statistics.

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Cameroon.

Food Imports

Analysis of the evolution of imports of key food products shows an overall downward trend between January 2025 and March 2026, falling from 65 billion CFA francs in January 2025 to 54 billion in March 2026. The level of imports in the first quarter of 2026 is generally lower than that recorded during the same period in 2025. This decline in food imports is mainly the result of reduced rice imports, following policies implemented since 2024 to expand rice cultivation areas combined with an increase in customs duties (5% on ordinary rice and 20% on luxury rice). The decrease continues the trend already observed in 2025 compared with 2024.

In addition, although less significant, the decline in maize imports (from 3.9 billion CFA francs in the first quarter of 2025 to around 0.6 billion in the first quarter of 2026) also contributes to the overall reduction in imports of major food products. Several factors explain this decline. In addition to maritime transport costs, which contributed to the decline in imports, the greater availability of these cereals was also linked to reduced informal exports to Nigeria, following the decision to suspend imports from outside the ECOWAS area, the depreciation of the Naira, and subsidised agricultural production in neighbouring Nigeria.

This reduction in imports could pose risks to cereal availability in the coming quarters, either due to a resumption of exports to Nigeria or an expected significant fall in production. However, the factors behind this decline in imports may disrupt small-scale producers, who are no longer able to sell at profitable prices or within the usual timeframes to meet their food needs in products other than cereals.

Figure 4. Evolution of imports of key food products [2]from January 2025 to March 2026



Source: Data from Directorate General of Customs.

Conflicts

Cameroon continues to face two major centres of instability that strongly affect food and nutrition security: the separatist crisis in the North-West and South-West regions, and the non-state armed groups (ISWAP and JAS/Boko Haram) insurgency in the Far North. These conflicts, classified as 'high-level' by ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), though localised, persist in disrupting production systems, livelihoods and demographic dynamics.

In the North-West and South-West, the overall intensity of the conflict has slightly decreased, but the level of violence remains high at the beginning of 2026. Between January and March, 676 incidents and 278 deaths were recorded, with a concentration in Mezam Division (16%), followed by Donga-Mantung, Momo, Fako, Lebialem and Meme (Data Export Tool | ACLED). The increase in kidnappings and extortion restricts movement in rural areas, limiting farmers' access to distant fields at the critical moment of launching the 2026 agricultural season.

In the Far North, armed groups-related violence reached its highest level since 2022, with 163 attacks and 122 deaths between January and March 2026 (Data Export Tool | ACLED). Mayo-Sava accounts for nearly half of the incidents. Armed groups are intensifying kidnappings, looting and destruction of property, particularly before the rainy season, a period when they seek to build up stocks through predation. This seasonality of attacks is expected to lead to a resurgence of violence between May and June, with direct implications for access to food, markets, livestock and household livelihoods.

Displacement

As of 31 March 2026, Cameroon had a total of 493,402 internally displaced persons originating from the North-West and South-West regions, 510,855 from the Lake Chad Basin, 409,379 refugees, and 790,842 returnees (refugees_and_internally_displaced_persons). Forced displacement has led to a loss of livelihoods for the displaced population and placed pressure on the resources of host communities and families, thereby resulting in a deterioration of food and nutrition security. These movements result mainly from conflicts, but also from flooding in the Far North.

Displaced persons from the North-West and South-West relocate either within the two regions or to the West, Littoral and Centre regions (refugees_and_internally_displaced_persons). Between January and March 2026, 7,234 new displacements were recorded, affecting access to land and livelihoods (https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/cameroun-suivi-des-urgences-140-28-fevrier-02-mars-2026?close=true).

In the Far North, displacements occur mainly within the region (refugees_and_internally_displaced_persons), with 11,837 new arrivals linked to attacks, kidnappings, arson and destruction of food stocks (https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/cameroun-suivi-des-urgences-140-28-fevrier-02-mars-2026?close=true). Priority host

[2] The main products taken into account are corn, wheat, rice, frozen sea fish, live animals, and animal or vegetable fats and oils.

localities include Blangoua-Bâche, Hilé-Alifa, Ngouma, Mokolo Centre and Moulvoudaye (synthèse des déplacements dans le mayo kani). These areas, already vulnerable, are under increased pressure on agricultural land, water, pastures and social services.

Finally, a less visible dimension concerns non-conflict-related mobility, driven by economic, environmental or social factors, which is gradually reshaping local dynamics and is often overlooked in risk monitoring because it is little or not documented.

Animal Health

In the first quarter of 2026, Cameroon faced a progressive deterioration in food security linked to the spread of peste des petits ruminants (PPR), according to the situation report of the epidemiosurveillance unit. Eight confirmed outbreaks in the North-West (Boyo), Far North (Mayo-Danay), West (Koung-Khi), South-West (Manyu, Fako), North (Bénoué) and Centre (Mefou et Afamba, Mfoundi) regions reflect multi-regional diffusion. The cumulative toll stands at 646 clinical cases and 410 deaths recorded since January 2026. The Boumba and Ngoko department (East) alone accounts for the heaviest toll (210 cases, 210 deaths – though not subject to analysis), followed by the North-West (256 cases, 91 deaths). However the outbreaks are under the status “stable and resolved” following WOAH standards.

This dynamic directly affects family-based livestock systems, one of the main sources of income for vulnerable households. Livestock losses, reduced production and decapitalisation have led to a decline in the supply of animal protein and an increase in prices (up to +25% for small ruminants). The combined effects of animal diseases, limited access to inputs, market disruptions and climatic shocks (drought, pasture scarcity) further exacerbate the vulnerability of agro-pastoral systems. These factors contribute to a deterioration across the four dimensions of food security: availability, access, utilisation and stability. The current situation corresponds to a transition phase between Stress and Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 2 to 3), with a risk of rapid worsening without reinforced intervention.

Fuel Prices and Imports

In Cameroon, fuel prices are administered, and it should be noted that from 3 February 2024, the country recorded an upward adjustment in the prices of petrol and diesel of around 15% respectively (Order No. 0039/MINCOMMERCE of 26 February 2024) and have remained relativeley stable since then. This resulted in higher transport costs, increased agricultural and logistical expenses, and consequently, higher food prices.

However, this trend has been somewhat moderated in certain regions of the country (Far North, North, Adamawa, North-West, South-West) bordering Nigeria, a major producer of petroleum products, which have seen an expansion of the informal fuel market commonly known as “zoua-zoua”. Historically, “zoua-zoua” fuel has been cheap. Yet, the recent combination of structural factors (Nigeria’s new energy policy), cyclical factors (removal of subsidies and rising fuel prices in Nigeria in 2023, etc.), and security-related factors (disruption of trade routes, reduction in the number of service stations, and the formation of quasi-monopolies and local cartels in crisis zones) has in turn triggered upward adjustments in its price between 20 and 33%, bringing it closer to that of officially distributed fuel.

Figure 5. Evolution of informal fuel prices "zoua-zoua" in certain regions of Cameroon in the first quarter of 2026



Source: PNVRSA and WFP Surveys.

The Cameroonian fuel market is characterised by an almost total dependence on petroleum product imports since the shutdown of the National Refining Company Limited (SONARA) refinery following a major fire in May 2019, which severely damaged several production units. Figure 6 shows the evolution of imports from January 2025 to March 2026.

An increase in fuel and lubricant imports is noted, in a context of war in the Middle East that led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of global oil transits.

Figure 6. Evolution 2fuel and lubricant imports from January 2025 to March 2026



Source: Data from the Directorate Generale of Customs.

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

Food Consumption

The World Food Programme's mVAM (mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping) survey for the first quarter of 2026 estimated the percentage of households with inadequate food consumption (poor or borderline), as well as the forecast of its rate of variation over a 90-day period.

Levels of inadequate food consumption are significantly higher in conflict-affected areas (the Far North, North-West and South-West regions, and the eastern corridor impacted by the Central African crisis) compared with the rest of the country. Nationally, around one quarter of households report inadequate food consumption, but this proportion rises above one third in conflict zones, particularly among internally displaced households. By contrast, in areas not affected by conflict, the share of households experiencing inadequate food consumption remains lower, at about one in five, supported by better market access, more stable agricultural production, and greater diversification of food sources.

Moreover, analysis of the rate of variation in the percentage of households facing inadequate food consumption shows relative stability in 8 out of 10 regions (variation within the range –5% and +5%, see Figure 7) over the 90-day period. Only two regions, the North and the North-West, recorded a slight increase in the proportion of households concerned. However, the relative stability observed at national level (average national variation of 1.43% over 90 days) conceals uneven localised deteriorations that may emerge in pressure zones, notably in the North, while non-conflict areas are expected to maintain this relative stability, with neither notable improvement nor marked deterioration.

Figure 7. Forecasts of the insufficient food consumption change over 90 days by region.



Source : WFP, mVAM Survey.

Coping Strategies

WFP's mVAM data for the first quarter of 2026 in Cameroon reveal a clear divide between consumption-related coping strategies in conflict zones and those elsewhere. In conflict zones, more than half of households report resorting to such strategies, including reducing portion sizes, decreasing the number of meals, or consuming less preferred foods. These behaviours reflect continued pressure on access to food from the beginning of the year.

Conversely, in non-affected zones, about one third of households report using these strategies, and the majority are still able to maintain acceptable consumption without frequently resorting to negative adjustments. This difference highlights a greater adaptive capacity in stable zones, despite persistent economic pressures.

Livelihoods Strategies

Disparities are even more pronounced in terms of livelihoods. mVAM data indicate that in conflict zones of Cameroon, a significant proportion of households relied as early as the first quarter of 2026 on negative economic coping strategies, including reducing essential non-food expenditures and, for a considerable share, selling productive assets. This situation reflects livelihoods already weakened by repeated shocks and severely limits households' capacity to absorb further pressures during the year.

In non- conflict zones, households generally benefit from more diversified and stable sources of income, specially from agriculture, livestock or local trade. This contributes to greater economic resilience and reduced dependence on negative coping mechanisms at the beginning of the year.

Malnutrition

In Cameroon, the monitoring of malnutrition cases relies on the tracking and management of admissions for severe acute malnutrition (SAM) among children under five in health districts across six regions considered priorities by the Ministry of Public Health (Adamawa, East, Far North, North, North-West, South-West). This approach tends to minimise the scale of the phenomenon at the national level.

Between January and March 2026, data from the Ministry of Public Health's DHIS2 platform indicate higher admissions for SAM—8,250 children in the Far North region (including 838 in Kousseri, 668 in Mokolo and 1,253 in Mora)—compared with much lower figures in other targeted regions. These districts, considered "red zones," are located in Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Tsanaga and Mayo-Sava, regularly affected by non-state armed groups attacks that trigger population displacement and severe food deficits.

However, many children screened within local communities remain unadmitted to treatment programmes due to personal reasons (refusal), economic constraints (hospitalisation and outpatient follow-up costs), and infrastructural barriers (distance from treatment centres), which underestimates the real burden of children suffering from acute malnutrition.

Community-based screenings of malnutrition, combined with the measles vaccination campaign of March 2026, identified 3,471 children in Bogo (Global Acute Malnutrition [GAM] 21.4%), 7,771 in Mora (GAM 20.2%), 2,088 in Kolofata (GAM 12.4%) and 1,594 in Maroua III (GAM 7.6%). This classifies Bogo and Mora as critical, Kolofata as serious, and Maroua III as Alert according to WHO thresholds.

Although the first quarter of 2026 is outside the lean season, identified causes of malnutrition include epidemic outbreaks—mainly measles (nationally: 6,583 cases with 36 deaths, according to Epidemiological Week 13 report)—inadequate complementary feeding leading to deficiencies, supply disruptions linked to reduced US funding that lowered active screening in the North, Adamawa, South-West, North-West and East regions, and the post-election crisis of 2025, which disrupted the distribution of inputs and food commodities. Moreover, the increased presence of technical and financial partners in the Far North region has come at the expense of other regions.

OUTLOOK

Food Security Situation (Anticipatory Projection for April–June 2026)

According to FEWS NET and Cadre Harmonisé projections, if current trends persist, several Cameroonian regions are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), with an increased risk of pockets of Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) among the most affected households, notably in the Far-North region (Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Danay), and parts of the North-West and South-West regions.

The April–June period also coincides with the onset of rains, exposing low-lying areas of the Far North to high flood risks, likely to damage early crops, rural infrastructure and trigger new displacements. This period also corresponds to a marked decline in household food stocks, reinforcing dependence on markets at a time when prices remain high.

The main anticipated risks for the next three months include:

- Persistent pressure on the supply of animal products (meat, eggs, fish);
- Sustained food inflation, limiting access to adequate diets for market-dependent households;
- Localised shortages, particularly in isolated areas affected by insecurity, flooding or early drying of water points;
- Earlier transhumance, linked to declining forage biomass and falling groundwater levels reported by vegetable growers, increasing risks of agro-pastoral conflict.

Fuel Supply Trends

Fuel supplies are marked by uncertainty caused by the Russia–Ukraine war, the Middle East conflict, and the shutdown of crude oil refining activities at the National Refining Company (SONARA) following a fire in production units in May 2019.

As of mid-March 2026, national fuel stocks remain low. Current autonomy is estimated at 38 days for petrol, 12 days for diesel and 11 days for Jet A1, based on volumes available at the Cameroon Oil Depots Company, excluding security stocks and without factoring in any reserves from SONARA (https://www.investiraucameroun.com/gestion-publique/1703-23195-produits-petroliers-le-cameroun-reajuste-son-schema-d-importation-sous-le-choc-iran-israel-etats-unis).

Given the country's now exclusive dependence on imports, fuel supply security is undermined by disrupted oil routes, pressure on public finances and declining foreign exchange reserves. Concerns about irregular supplies and a potential fuel shortage across the national territory may arise if the current geopolitical crisis persists. Consequences would be dramatic, including inevitable increases in pump prices, generalised inflation, and knock-on effects on fertiliser availability. Against this backdrop, significant declines in both the availability and accessibility of food faced by households are likely to be observed in the future.

ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by region

Table 2 shows the number of JMR divisional alerts for each indicator by region.

Table 2. Number of divisional JMR alerts and region from January to March 2026

	Drought-NDVI		Drought-Rainfall		Exchange rate		Food prices		Volatility-Exchange rate		Volatility-Food price	
Region	**Critical**	**heighted**	**Critical**	**heighted**	**Critical**	**heighted**	**Critical**	**heighened**	**Critical**	**heighted**	**Critical**	**heighted**
Adamawa			5	1								4
Center			7	2								3
East			1									12
Far North												3
Coastline				1							1	11
North			1								1	5
Northwest			7					10			5	4
West		1	8									
South												3
Southwest	1		2									12
Total	**1**	**1**	**31**	**4**				**10**			**7**	**57**

Annex II. JMR alerts by division with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by division. The divisions with the highest alert level, between 3 and 7, are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (orange), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by division.

Table 3. JMR alerts by division showing a higher risk of deterioration in food and nutrition security between January and March 2026

Region	Division	Alert level	Drought-NDVI	Drought-Rainfall	Exchange rate	Food prices	Volatility - Exchange rate	Volatility - Food price
Adamaoua	Mayo-Banyo	3		2				1
Adamaoua	Mbéré	4		1				3
Centre	Haute-Sanaga	4		1				3
East	Boumba-et-Ngoko	3						3
East	Upper Nyong	3						3
East	Kadey	3						3
East	Lom-et-Djérem	4		1				3
Far North	Diamaré	3						3
Littoral	Moungo	4		1				3
Littoral	Nkam	3						3
Littoral	Sanaga-Maritime	3						3
Littoral	Wouri	3						3
North	Benue	3						3
North	Mayo-Rey	3						3
Northwest	Bui	3		1		2		
Northwest	Donga-Mantung	4		1		3		
Northwest	Menchum	7		1		3		3
Northwest	Mezam	3		1		1		3
Northwest	Ngo-Ketunjia	4		1				3
South	Ocean	3						3
Southwest	Kupe-Manenguba	4	1					3
Southwest	Manyu	3		1				2
Southwest	Even	3						3
Southwest	Ndian	3						3

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts

The figure 8 below shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all 58 divisions. The graphs show the percentage of the total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.

Figure 8. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2015 to March 2026)



Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels

Figure 9. Percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC/CH 3 or worse food insecurity levels (January 2015 to March 2026)



Annex V. Sources and time frames of JMR risk indicators and target variables

Table 4. Indicator sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Risk indicator				
Drought-NDVI	WFP	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cmr-ndvi-subnational	01/01/2010	01/03/2026
Drought-Rainfall	WFP	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cmr-rainfall-subnational	01/01/2010	01/03/2026
Exchande rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/catalog/6139	01/01/2010	01/03/2026
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/catalog/4487	01/01/2010	01/03/2026
Target Variable				
Famine Early Warning Systems Network	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	10/01/2024

Table 5. Method of indicators and alert thresholds

Risk indicator	Method of indicators	Heightened Risk Threshold	Critical Risk Threshold
Drought-NDVI	The original value represents the averaged normalized difference vegetation index. The indicator value was constructed from the original value using a zscore with median for all data over the last 1 month(s). An alert is raised when the indicator value is below the threshold.	-1.07	-1.69
Drought-Rainfall	The original value represents the average rainfall per dekad in mm. The indicator value was constructed from the original value using a Standard Precipitation Index over the last 1 month(s). An alert is raised when the indicator value is below the threshold.	-1.39	-1.5
Exchange rate	The original value represents the exchange rate in CFA Francs to usd. The indicator value was constructed from the original value using a percentual change over the last 13 month(s). An alert is raised when the indicator value is above the threshold.	0.02	0.06
Food prices	The original value represents the index is based on all food commodities. The indicator value was constructed from the original value using a percentual change over the last 13 month(s). An alert is raised when the indicator value is above the threshold.	0.06	0.16
Volatility-Exchange rate	The original value represents the exchange rate in CFA Francs to usd. The indicator value was constructed from the original value using a Relative Strength Index of the volatility (Yang Zhang method) over the last 11 month(s). An alert is raised when the indicator value is above the threshold	66.23	72.34
Volatility-Food price	The original value represents the index is based on all food commodities. The indicator value was constructed from the original value using a Relative Strength Index of the volatility (Yang Zhang method) over the last 12 month(s). An alert is raised when the indicator value is above the threshold.	57.1	72.1

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust quaterly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging crisis risks. The report aims to complement the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) or the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from the government of Cameroon (through MINADER, MINEPIA, NIS, MINSANTE, MINAT, MINAS and ONACC), FAO, WFP, IOM, ACF, FEWSNET, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical underpinnings of the JMR model is available in this World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. A Policy Research Working Paper with the JMR methodology and additional FNS indicators adapted to the context of Cameroon is being finalised.

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